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STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE 
Action by father who had legitimated a child born out 
of wedlock to obtain visitation rights after the mother, who 
had custody of the child, had cut off visitation and denied 
him access to the child. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The Court found that plaintiff legitimated the child, 
Corey Leon Slade, pursuant to 78-30-12 U.C.A. (1953); acknowledged 
the child as his own son, and received him into his family and 
treated him as a legitimate child. The Court awarded plaintiff 
visitation rights with the child, Corey; and ordered plaintiff 
to pay support of $150.00 per month, commencing August, 1977. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The judgment of the trial court should be affirmed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff-Respondent feels that the statement of fa~ts 
as outlined by Defendant-Appellant, is integrated with argument 
and needs to be clarified and amplified to reflect the following 
important and undisputed facts. 
The child, Corey Leon Slade, was born March 20, 1974. 
Plaintiff's paternity of the child has never been disputed by 
either party. (T. 188) Plaintiff signed a Declaration of 
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Paternity prior to the birth of the child, on or about 
March 5, 1975, which document was admitted into evidence 
as Exhibit 2-P. (T. 189-190) Plaintiff was present at the ti~ 
of the birth of the child and paid all of the expenses of the bn 
(T. 219-220) The Declaration of Paternity (Exhibit 2-P) was 
signed by plaintiff with the express intention of recognizing 
Corey as his child. (T. 224). The child has always carried 
(T. 21 the name of plaintiff since his birth, the name of Slade. 
After the birth of the child, plaintiff continued to pay 
medical expenses for the child (T. 228); placed the child on 
his medical insurance policy with his employer, and provided 
the child's mother with a card (T. 223); and assisted with 
the support of the child, both with the payment of money and 
purchase of clothing. (T.220-221, 223, and 228) Further, 
plaintiff made the child a beneficiary under a life insurance 
policy in the sum of $10,000.00. (T. 239) 
Plaintiff continued his relationship with the child's 
mother until after the child's second birthday when they 
"drifted apart", and plaintiff reunited with his former wife. 
(T. 226) Mr. Slade saw the child on frequent occasions from 
his birth until defendant married Mr. Dennis on May 15, 1976. 
(T. 224-226) It was at that time, Mrs. Dennis, the defendant, 
refused to let plaintiff see the child as he had in the first 
twenty-seven months of the child's life. (T. 226) Defendant-
-2-
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Appellant asserts that Mr. Dennis, the defendant's husband, 
while living with her without the benefit of marriage, (6 months) 
developed a relationship with the child, Corey. (T. 247) 
From the time Corey was two weeks old, plaintiff took 
the child into his family and treated the child as if it were 
a legitimate child. The child was taken to Mr. Slade's parents' 
home on many occasions by the.plaintiff. (T. 192-193, 197) 
Corey's first birthday was celebrated by both the families 
of plaintiff and defendant at defendant's home. (T. 193) 
Corey's second and third birthdays, as well as Christmas and 
other holidays were celebrated at the home of Mr. Slade's 
parents. (T. 194) Photographs were taken of these special 
occasions, as well as others, by plaintiff and his family, which 
were introduced into evidence. (T. 195) Corey referred to the 
plaintiff as "Daddy" until his third birthday. (T. 199, 205) 
The sister of plaintiff, Connie Slade Anderson, and her children, 
Corey's cousins, were present on many occasions when Corey was 
with plaintiff at his parents' home. (T. 204-205) A close 
relationship was established between Corey and his cousins during 
this period of time. (T. 205) Plaintiff's family planned 
activities, celebration of holidays, and other special occasions 
around Corey "as a member of the family" so that Corey would be 
present and take part as a member of the family. (T.206) 
-3-
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Plaintiff took Corey in the company of friends and other 
acquaintances, and held him out publicly as his son. (T. 212-211 
There never was a time from the birth of Corey that the 
plaintiff did not regard him as his legitimate child. (T. 248) 
Appellant makes issue of the fact that plaintiff never 
asked her to marry him. However, he did present her with a 
diamond ring as a step toward~matrimony at approximately the 
time that their relationship "drifted apart". (T. 239) 
Defendant-Appellant also makes issue of the fact that she 
resided with the child, Corey, in circumstances characterized 
by her in her brief as "poverty-level lodging". It is worthy 
to note that from the time that Mr. Slade first met Mrs. Dennis, 
February 22, 1973 (T. 242), she resided in the place that she 
characterizes as "poverty-level lodging", with her sister, 
(Patricia Ann Sanchez) prior to the birth of the child, and 
for approximately one year after the birth of the child. (T. 
148) 
Plaintiff was placed in the position of having to request 
the aid of the Court in regaining visitation with Corey after 
Mrs. Dennis had refused him access to the child. Judge Conder 
granted temporary visitation with the child, Corey, to plaintiff, 
pending hearing of Plaintiff's Complaint on the merits. 
Pursuant to the Order of Judge Conder, Plaintiff was required W 
pick up the child and return the child at Defendant's mother's~ 
-4-
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(R. 22-23) 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE FACTS PRESENTED BY THE EVIDENCE OVER-
WHELMINGLY SUPPORT THE FINDING OF THE LOWER COURT 
THAT PLAINTIFF LEGITIMATED THE CHILD BY ACKNOW-
LEDGEMENT, PURSUANT TO SECTION 78-30-12, UTAH CODE 
ANNOTATED, 1953. 
The first issue that was before the lower court was 
whether plaintiff-respondent had legitimized his child, 
Corey Leon Slade, under the provisions of Section 78-30-12, 
Utah Code Annotated, (1953). This section of our law sets 
out specifically what must be done to legitimize a child and 
reads as follows: 
The father of an illegitimate child, by 
publicly acknowledging it as his own, receiving it 
as such, with the consent of his wife, if he is 
married, into his family, and otherwise treating 
it as if it were a legitimate child, thereby adopts 
it as such, and such child is thereupon deemed for 
all purposes legitimate from the time of its birth. 
Judge Winder, after hearing all of the evidence presented 
by the parties, including various memorandums, in his memorandum 
decision of August 1, 1977 (R. 91-92) found that plaintiff-
respondent legitimated the child, Corey Leon Slade, by acknow-
ledgement under the above cited statute. In so finding, 
Judge Winder stated: 
"The Court finds that the plaintiff legitimated 
the child, Corey Leon Slade, by acknowledgement pursuant 
to 78-30-12 U.C.A. (1953), including that plaintiff 
received Corey as plaintiff's own and into plaintiff's 
family and that plaintiff had treated Corey as a 
legitimate child." (Emphasis added) 
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It was established from the evidence presented as an 
undisputed fact, that the paternity of the child has never 
been disputed by either party. (T. 188) That plaintiff signed I 
a Declaration of Paternity prior to the birth of the child, 
on or about March 5, 1975, which document was admitted into 
evidence as Exhibit 2-P. (T. 189-190) The Declaration of 
Paternity was signed by plaintiff with the express intention 
of recognizing Corey as his child. (T. 224) The child had 
always carried the name of plaintiff since his birth, the 
name of Slade. (T. 219) That plaintiff had a continual rela-
tionship with the child since its birth, up until the time that 
defendant married and then refused to let plaintiff see the 
child as he had been allowed to do in the first twenty-seven 
months of the child's life. (T. 224-226) From the time Corey 
was two weeks old, plaintiff took the child into his family and 
treated the child as if it were a legitimate child. (T. 192-19:1 
197) A close relationship was established between the child, I 
Corey, plaintiff's parents, his sister and his sister's children, 1 
Corey's cousins. (T. 193-195, 204-205) Corey became a member 
of plaintiff's family which consisted of the plaintiff, his 
parents, his sisters and Corey's cousins. (T. 206) Plaintiff 
took Corey in the company of his friends and other acquaintances, 
and held him out publicly as his son. (T. 212-215) There 
never was a time from the birth of Corey that the plaintiff did 
From these I not regard him as his legitimate child. (T. 248) 
cited facts, it is clear that the plaintiff complied with the 
-6-
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provisions of the statute by (1) publicly acknowledging the 
child as his own, and (2) receiving it as such into his 
family, and otherwise treating it as if it were a legitimate 
child. 
Defendant-appellant takes issue with the term "family". 
The meaning of the term "family" is not confined strictly to 
a collection of people under one roof, with one head. See 
generally, 10 Am. Jur. 2d Bastards Sec. 54, 33 ALR 2d 745 
Sec. 20. A family within the contemplation of the statute 
may be maintained by a single man who has a settled place of 
habitation of which he is the head. Re Grids Estate, 157 
Cal. 534, 108 P. 499. Receiving into the family implies an 
actual and physical acceptance of the child into such place. 
Where no home exists, the child may be received into the 
father's family within the meaning of the statute. Courts have 
recognized a constructive reception into a family, as a public 
and proud acknowledgement of paternity. Darwin v. Granger, 
174 Cal. App. 2d 63, 344 P.2d 353; see also, 10 Am Jur. 2d, 
Bastard, Sec. 55. In this case, plaintiff's family consisted 
of the plaintiff, his parents, his sisters, and Corey's cousins. 
It was clearly established from the evidence to the satisfaction 
of the lower court, that Corey Leon Slade had been accepted 
into the plaintiff's family as it existed within the meaning 
of the statute, and therefore, the requirements of the statute 
had been fully met by plaintiff and the child was deemed, for 
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all purposes, legitimate from the time of its birth. The 
judgment and finding of the lower court that Corey Leon Slade 
was legitimate from his birth should be affirmed where it is 
clearly and substantially supported by the evidence in this 
case. Nelson v. Nelson, 30 Utah 2d 80, 513 P.2d 1011, 1973; 
Glazier and Sons, Inc. v. Larsen, 26 Utah 2d 429, 491 P.2d 226 
(1971). 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN 
GRANTING PLAINTIFF VISITATION RIGHTS WITH HIS 
LEGITIMATED SON, COREY LEON SLADE. 
The second question confronting the trial court in this 
case was may a putative father be awarded the privilege of 
visiting his illegitimate child who was in the custody of 
the mother? Courts, in relation to present day society, have 
recognized some degree of rights in the acknowledged father of 
a child born out of wedlock. In Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 
645 (1971), the Court in striking down as violative of the due 
process clause, an Illinois statutory scheme where the father 
of an illegitimate child, regardless of whether he had acknow-
ledged the child, was not entitled to notice of hearings 
determining whether the child was to be a dependent of the 
State, gave recognition to the paternal rights of a putative 
father. The Utah Supreme Court, in State in Interest of "M", 
25 Utah 2d 101, 476 P.2d 1013 (1970} was faced with an issue 
similar to Stanley, (supra). The mother of the child faced 
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proceedings in the Juvenile Court which sought to deprive her 
of parental rights and the father sought to enter the action 
and assert his right to custody. The Juvenile Court refused 
to heRr him. This Court, after first discussing the common-
law background of bastards and sketching the departure from 
"filius nullius" of the common law, ruled that a statutory 
parent-child relationship existed between the publicly 
acknowledged child and his father. Since the father's duty 
of support and education of the child was the same as if it 
had been born in wedlock, then it followed that his right 
to custody should be "almost as co-extensive." The Court 
ruled that the father was entitled to custody and control 
as against all but the mother, if he (1) was competent and 
suitable, and (2) it was in the child's best interests. 
In Commonwealth v. Rozanski, 206 Pa. Super. 397, 213 A.2d 
155, 15 ALR 3d 880 (1965), the father, Frank J. Rozanski, 
filed a petition to obtain visitation rights with his illegitimate 
son. The facts and circumstances of that case closely parallel 
the instant case before the Court. Mr. Rozanski had established 
a relationship with his child and made regular visits with the 
child when the mother, in whose custody the child was, refused 
to allow him to continue visitations because she had met a man 
interested in marrying her who might adopt the child. The 
Court, in granting vistiation rights to Mr. Rozanski, after 
considering decisions of other courts confronted with this 
problem and the facts and circumstances of this case, clearly 
-9-
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recognized that such privileges may be granted. In rendering 
its opinion, the Court stated: 
"In each of these cases, the primary concern 
of the Court was not the illegitimacy of the child 
or the relationship of the parties; the ultimate 
decision was based upon the child's welfare." 
"We similarly recognize that in any case 
involving visitation, neither the fact of illegitimacy 
nor the personal preferences or prejudices of the 
parents should control our decision. The governing 
criterion must always Qe the welfare and best 
interests of the child." 
"Illegitimacy, however, continues to strike a 
discordant and jarring note in our society. It is 
regarded as the fruit of a union of shame, irreverance 
and depravity. We have not yet achieved that sophis-
tication or charity which would allow us to understand 
and deal with this problem without passion. Indeed, 
our wrath has most often been visited not upon those 
who have violated our ethical and moral codes, but, 
rather upon the blameless child." 
* * * * 
"We recognize that granting visitation privileges 
to the putative father may not always serve the child's 
best interests. Visitation rights, however, are always 
a matter for the supervision of the courts. Should it 
appear, after visitation privileges have been granted, 
that the father's presence has an adverse effect on the 
child's welfare, the right to visit may be withdrawn." 
(Emphasis added) 
"In summary, every case must be decided on 
the basis of its own particular facts. The unique 
problems of each child must receive individual 
attention and consideration. Any attempt by us to 
determine the best interests of every child by a 
single rule would be judicially, socially and 
morally unsound." (Emphasis added) 
The trial court has broad discretion in deciding questio~ 
regarding custody and visitation. It cannot be said under the 
-10-
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facts and circumstances of this case that the Court abused 
its discretion in determining that plaintiff was entitled to 
visitation with the minor child, Corey, and that such visitation 
was not in the best interests of the child. 
The Court, in granting Mr. Rozanski visitation rights, 
looked to the facts and circumstances which were as follows: 
(a) Frank J. Rozanski, a married man, and 
Evelyn Gwiszcz, a single girl, became the parents 
of a baby boy, Bruce, on June 21, 1961. 
(b) The putative father paid the hospital bills 
incurred at the time of birth. 
(c) For approximately one year, until he lost his 
job, he contributed to the support of the child. 
(d) Mr. Rozanski started divorce proceedings in 
order to marry Miss Gwiszcz; however, after several 
visits to a priest, they decided not to marry. Subse-
quently, Mr. Rozanski was reconciled with his wife. 
(e) The putative father testified that his 
relationship with the child was excellent. He also 
stated that he felt a moral obligation to support and 
educate the child as though he were his legitimate son. 
(f) He visited his son on an average of three times 
a week. During these visits, he brought clothes and toys 
for the boy; took him to the doctor and participated in 
various activities with him. 
(g) The child, Bruce, called him "Daddy". 
However, differences arose between the mother and 
Mr. Rozanski, to the result that arguments resulted in 
physical abuse of the mother by Mr. Rozanski. 
(h) Mr. Rozanski was denied access to the boy by 
Miss Gwiszcz when she met a young man whom she intended 
to marry, not immediately, but in the future. Since 
her possible future husband might wish to adopt the 
child, she did not want Mr. Rozanski to continue seeing 
Bruce. 
-11-
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(i) In February, 1964, Mr. Rozanski sought the 
aid of the Courts in order to acquire visitation rights. 
It is apparent that the facts and circumstances which 
existed in the Rozanski case closely parallel those in this 
case, with some variations. In this case, the child took the 
name of Mr. Slade as opposed to the mother's name. VisitatioM 
were with Mr. Slade's entire family. Substantial benefit has 
been derived by the visitations in that a close relationship 
has developed between Corey and his cousins. 
Judge Winder had the opportunity to observe the plaintiff 
and appraise his fitness. He also was in a better position to 
determine the weight to be given the testimony of Mrs. Virginia 
Husbands, a Certified Clinical Social Worker, called as a witne:; 
by the defendant-appellant. Most of the testimony of Mrs. Husbar 
was based upon conjecture and in reliance upon a "perfunctory 
reading" of an uncertified transcript of the testimony of the 
plaintiff on the morning of the hearing. (T. 163-165) 
Judge Winder ruled that if the reporter filed an affidavit that, 
the transcript used by Mrs. Husbands was a true and correct 
transcript of the testimony, her opinion based on that transcrirl 
may be testified to. If the affidavit of the reporter was not 
filed, any opinion of Mrs. Husbands based upon the transcript 
would be stricken. (T. 166) From the record transmitted on 
appeal, it does not appear that the reporter filed the required 
affidavit and therefore, the entire testimony of Mrs. Husband, 
based upon the reading of the transcript should be stricken 
-12-
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and disregarded. 
Defendant-appellant in her brief, at page 8, stated 
that Mrs. Husbands summarized Mr. Slade's conduct as a 
"dastardly thing to do to a child". Mrs. Husbands was 
requested to define what she meant by "dastardly". In 
response to the question, Mrs. Husbands stated the following: 
"In my experience, dealing with children who are 
made to be in conflict between the parents, there 
is a constant fear of ~he loss of one parent because 
of the love of the other. That is what I mean about 
this being a very, very cruel thing to do to a child, 
to place a child in that kind of conflict. A child 
needs the love of both parents and when this is in 
jeopardy, I think that the whole basis for self-esteem 
and self-confidence and receiving what a child needs 
is in jeopardy." 
Mrs. Husbands' use of the term "dastardly" was not in reference 
to the conduct of Mr. Slade. The term used by her did not 
summarize the conduct of Mr. Slade as claimed by the defendant-
appellant. (T. 166-168) Further clarification of the statement, 
"This is a dastardly thing to do to a child", was made by 
Mrs. Husbands at page 172 of the transcript in response to the 
question of Mr. Schumacher. 
"In the situation of divorce and a marriage, the 
more typical one that you say you deal with, you 
recognize that the father has a legal right to see the 
children, and then you say, "This is a dastardly thing 
to do to the child", there are legal rights and that is 
the framework in which some people have to live." 
A. Yes, maybe that is what I mean by being 
dastardly. 
Q. So you don't -- you feel that the law, 
itself, may be 
A. Places children in conflict. 
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Q. And that is a necessary result very often 
of that particular law? 
A. And unfortunately so, yes. 
This situation of conflict was readily recognized by 
Judge Winder during the course of the proceeding when he 
stated: 
"It isn't necessarily what I would like to do 
anymore than I like to.have visitation by the father 
after the divorce. I think it is disruptive and I 
think it is going to be very disruptive to have Mr. Slade 
--somewhat disruptive to have him visit the child. But 
I think that it is inherent in any divorce situation." 
The Court in the Rozanski case (supra) was cognizant 
of the fact that due to the strained relationship between the 
parents, a conflict may arise that could be disruptive to 
the child. In recognizing this problem, the Court stated: 
"Visitation rights of the putative father of 
an illegitimate child in the mother's custody are 
a matter for the supervision of the courts, and if 
it appears after visitation privileges have been 
granted, that the father's presence has an adverse 
effect on the child's welfare, the right to visit 
may be withdrawn." 
Mrs. Husbands testified that this conflict was one between 
the child's natural father and natural mother. (T. 167 at 
lines 17-19) The evidence presented at trial indicated that 
the conflict that existed, if any, was between the child's 
natural father and Mr. Dennis, the husband of the natural 
mother. (T. 147) Mrs. Husbands testified that the difficulty, 
the confusion and the conflict that is predictable in visitati~ 
may eventually be overcome if there is a loving relationship 
between the parents with whom the child spends most of his time. 
-14-
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(T. 166) 
The lower court, in rendering its decision, took into 
consideration, all of the facts and circumstances presented by 
the evidence, the respective memorandums of the parties submitted 
to the Court, the testimony of Mrs. Husbands, and the report 
of Dr. Goates. (T. 183) What weight is to be given to the 
report of Dr. Goates, and the testimony of Mrs. Husbands lies 
A 
within the discretionary powers of the trial court. Unless 
it is made to appear that the trial court's decision granting 
to plaintiff-respondent visitation rights with his legitimated 
son consittutes a clear abuse of discretion, and clearly 
appears that such was not in the best interests of the child, 
the decision of Judge Winder in this matter should not be 
overturned. Owen v. Owen, Utah P.2d, 1978; Merrill v. 
Merrill, Utah P.2d 1978. A statutory parent-child relationship 
was created between the plaintiff-respondent, and the publicly 
acknowledged child, Corey Leon Slade, that places the child 
in parity with the legitimate child in rights of support, 
education and inheritance. In the Matter of "M", (supra), it 
has always been recognized that the trial court has a large 
measure of power in fixing custody of children and visitation 
rights and, in the absence of showing of manifest abuse of 
discretion, its decree will not be interfered with on appeal. 
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CONCLUSION 
The finding of the trial court that the plaintiff, 
Bryan L. Slade, legitimated the child, Corey Leon Slade, by 
acknowledgement pursuant to 78-30-12, U.C.A. (1953), including 
the finding that plaintiff received Corey into his family and 
treated him as a legitimate child, is clearly and substantial~ 1 
supported by facts establish~d by the evidence and should not 
be disturbed on appeal. The defendant failed to sustain her 
burden of proof that the granting of visitation rights to the 
plaintiff by the trial court clearly constituted an abuse of ib 1 
I 
discretion and that the granting of such visitation rights wouN[ 
not be in the best interests of the minor child. The judgment I 
of the trial court should be affirmed. 1 
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CERTIFICATE 
Delivered three copies of the foregoing Brief of 
Plaintiff-Respondent this day of August, 1978, to 
Judith Romney Wolbach. 
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